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1. Introduction 
Using the first eleven waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey, this study examines whether and to what extent low pay employment is 
persistent  (i.e., state-dependence of low pay), and whether and to what extent low pay leads to 
higher pay (i.e., stepping stone effects of low pay), among Australian workers. While there is a 
sizable literature on persistence of low pay overseas, Australian research on this issue is limited.  
Increasing earnings inequality over the last three decades or so and an emphasis on a work-first 
approach to welfare reform since mid-1990s have prompted an increasing number of studies on 
low pay employment in industrialised economies. These studies are aimed at enhancing 
understanding how low paid workers fare in the labour market, particularly whether low paid 
workers tend to stay in low pay employment or use it as a stepping stone to higher pay. Answers 
to these questions have important policy implications.  
From a welfare policy perspective, if low pay employment acts as a stepping stone to higher pay, 
welfare reforms that promote employment, even it is low paid, such as the work-first approach to 
welfare recipients, have a good chance to improve the financial wellbeing of welfare recipients 
over time and are therefore justified. On the other hand, if low pay employment tends to be 
persistent or even leads to a vicious cycle between low pay and unemployment, an appropriate 
level of in work benefit provided through the welfare system may be required to alleviate 
financial difficulty of low paid workers (Cappellari 2002, 2007; Buddelmeyer et al. 2010). 
From an earnings inequality perspective, transitory low pay means that earnings inequality is 
shared among individuals over their life-cycle, while persistent low pay implies low pay 
concentrates in a fraction of the population, who may be excluded from sharing economic 
prosperity in the long-run. Therefore, while an adequate minimum wage is a justifiable policy 
instrument if low pay is persistent, it may not be appropriate if low pay is transitory and acts as a 
stepping stone to higher pay, since a wage floor established by minimum wages may reduce the 
opportunity for low-skilled workers to enter employment in the first place (Cappellari 2002, 
2007).
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Descriptive analysis of survey data tends to indicate persistence of low pay employment. 
However, observed persistence in low pay may have various causes, which in turn has different 
policy implications. For example, persistent low pay may be due to persistent individual 
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 Although empirical evidence has so far been mixed, it has been argued that an introduction or an increase of 
minimum wages could price out low skilled workers whose productivity is below the minimum wage. For a 
comprehensive review of the literature on this issue, see (Neumark and Wascher 2007). 
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characteristics, such as low skills (i.e., observed heterogeneity) and/or low ability (i.e., 
unobserved heterogeneity), and therefore has nothing to do with previous labour market or 
earnings experience. On the other hand, past low pay experience itself may cause low pay in the 
future (i.e., genuine state-dependence of low pay), leading to persistence in low pay. There are 
several possible reasons for genuine state-dependence in low pay employment. For example, low 
pay employment may not lead to accumulation or may even cause deterioration of human capital 
if a low paid job is of low quality; and this consequently reduces the chance of low paid workers 
moving into a higher paid job in the future. From an employer’s perspective, past low pay 
employment may be viewed as a signal of low productivity of the worker, which again reduces 
the chance of the worker moving into a higher paid job. Obviously, persistence of low pay as a 
result of genuine state-dependence requires a different policy response than persistence of low 
pay resulting from persistent differences in individual characteristics. 
With the availability of panel data, an increasing number of studies have been devoted to the 
dynamics of low pay employment (e.g., Gregory and Elias 1994; Sloane and Theodossiou 1998; 
Gosling et al. 1997; Stewart and Swaffield 1999; Cappellari 2002, 2007; Cappellari and Jenkins 
2008; Clark and Kanellopoulos 2009; Stewart 2007). These studies examine what factors affect 
workers’ low pay status with a particular interest in genuine state dependence of low pay. These 
studies estimate state-dependence of low pay by examining the difference between the 
probability of remaining in low pay and the probability of transitioning into low pay from higher 
pay, taking into account the differences in individual characteristics. Statistically significant 
state-dependence of low pay has been found by a number of studies even after observed and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity is accounted for (e.g., Cappellari and Jenkins 2008; 
Uhlendorff 2006; Clark and Kanellopoulos 2009; Stewart 2007).
2
  
A related theme of research in low pay dynamics examines whether low pay employment and 
unemployment are inter-related. This question arises due to the concern that low paid workers 
may cycle between low pay and unemployment with little hope to move up the labour market 
ladder. For example, descriptive analyses by Dunlop (2001) and Perkins and Scutella (2008), 
while using different data sources, show that low paid workers are more likely than higher paid 
workers to move into joblessness in the future. As shown in Table 1 later, descriptive analysis in 
this current study produces a similar result. That is, on a year-on-year basis, workers on low pay 
                                                 
2
 Using linked employer-employee data of Germany, Mosthaf, Schnabel and Stephani (2011) examine the factors 
that affect the upward mobility of wages by restricting their analysis to those who were initially low paid, and find 
that those low paid workers who are younger, better qualified, and work in larger firms are more likely to move up 
the earnings ladder. Stepping stone effects and state-dependence of low pay are not examined in this study. 
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have a higher probability of transitioning to either unemployment or not in the labour force 
(NILF) than workers on higher pay for both males and females. This descriptive result has not 
taken into account the impacts of observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
Using the first seven-wave HILDA survey to examine the dynamics of unemployment, 
Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) find that relative to higher pay, low pay experience has only a modest 
effect on the probability of experiencing unemployment in the future when observed and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity is accounted for. This result is consistent with Cappellari 
and Jenkins (2008) for the UK men; but different from Stewart (2007) who finds that low wage 
employment has almost as large an adverse impact as unemployment on future employment 
prospects and that low wage jobs act as the main conduit for repeated unemployment. Uhlendorff 
(2006) finds that for German men those on low pay have a higher probability of becoming 
jobless than those on higher pay, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
Most of the earlier studies on persistence of low pay treat low pay as a binary variable and infer 
state-dependence of low pay by comparing the predicted probability of remaining in low pay 
with the predicted probability of transitioning into low pay from higher pay (e.g., Stewart and 
Swaffield 1999; Cappellari and Jenkins 2008; Clark and Kanellopoulos 2009). As such, the 
potential stepping stone effects of low pay are often not examined by these studies, because 
inferring the stepping stone effects would need to compare the probability of transitioning into 
higher pay from low pay with the probability of transitioning into higher pay from non-
employment states (i.e., unemployment and NILF).  
In a dynamic Probit model framework and using the German SOEP, Knabe and Plum (2010) 
examine the stepping stone effect of low pay relative to unemployment by including both lagged 
unemployment and lagged low pay as the right hand side variables. They find that low pay can 
act as a stepping stone to better pay employment, particular for those who do not have a college 
degree, who have been unemployed more often in the past and whose low paid job carries a 
relatively high social status. While the model takes account potential endogeneity of initial low 
pay, initial unemployment is assumed to be exogenous. Given their estimation results show that 
initial low pay is not exogenous, it is likely that initial unemployment is endogenous. 
Consequently, the estimates of the model are likely to be biased. 
Departing from the earlier studies on low pay persistence, this current study examines both state 
dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay employment by estimating a dynamic random 
effects multinomial logit model. It appears the only study that takes a similar approach is 
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Uhlendorff (2006). Using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) waves 1998 to 
2003, Uhlendorff (2006) examines low pay dynamics of German men and finds that while there 
exists genuine state-dependence in low pay as well as in non-employment, there is also evidence 
of a stepping stone effect of low pay as compared with non-employment. 
However, unlike Uhlendorff (2006) who treats unemployment and NILF as one labour force 
state (i.e., non-employment), this current study models the two non-employment states 
separately. The distinction between NILF and unemployment is particularly important in 
estimating the stepping stone effect of low pay since the stepping stone effect may differ 
depending on whether low pay employment is compared with NILF or with unemployment. A 
priori, one would expect that those who are unemployed are more likely than those who are out 
of the labour force to obtain a higher paid job. That is, the stepping stone effect of low pay 
employment is expected be larger when NILF than when unemployment is used as a 
counterfactual to low pay employment. Also, unlike the earlier studies that tend to exclude 
females from their analyses, this current study examines low pay dynamics of both Australian 
males and females. 
The results from the current study show that both state-dependence and stepping stone effects of 
low pay are present among Australian workers after observed and unobserved individual 
heterogeneity is accounted for. The results also show that, other things being equal, people who 
are on low pay are more likely to be in employment in the future than those who are either 
unemployed or NILF. On the other hand, people on low pay do not appear to be more likely to 
become jobless in the future than those on higher pay. In other words, the evidence provided in 
this study does not support a low pay-no pay cycle among Australian workers. 
2. Econometric model and estimation strategy 
Econometric model 
The key question of this study is whether, and to what extent, current labour force/earnings 
status, particularly low pay state, affects future labour force/earnings status. To answer this 
question, we need to model the transition of the labour force/earnings states - NILF, 
unemployment, low pay and higher pay - over time. 
The four labour force/earnings states do not have a natural order from an individual perspective. 
One statistical model that is often used to model labour market outcomes that have no a natural 
order is the multinomial logit model. Under this modelling framework, at a point of time t, an 
individual i occupies one of the four mutually exclusive labour force/earnings states: NILF, 
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unemployment, low pay and higher pay (denoted by k =1,2,3 and 4). The probability of 
individual i occupying a state k at time t (i.e., Pi,k,t) is assumed to be determined by the 
individual’s previous labour force/earnings status and a vector of other observed and unobserved 
individual characteristics, 
 (1)       (              )  
   (                   )
∑    (                    )
 
   
                   . 
Where      is a (row) vector of dummy variables indicating labour force/earnings states of 
individual i at time t;      is a (row) vector of observed characteristics of the individual at time t, 
such as education level, marital status and age;      summarizes unobserved individual factors  
that could affect the probability of occupying state k and that do not change over time (i.e., 
unobserved individual heterogeneity); and                   are the coefficient parameters to 
be estimated. 
The model in equation (1) differs from a conventional multinomial logit model in three aspects. 
First, lagged labour force/earnings status is included as explanatory variables. The coefficient 
estimates on the lagged dependent variables will allow us to infer the extent of stepping stone 
effects and state-dependence of low pay employment. Second, the model controls for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity (i.e.,     ). If unobserved heterogeneity exists, but is not controlled for, 
the estimated stepping stone effects and state-dependence will be biased. This is because 
coefficient estimates on explanatory variables, particularly the lagged dependent variables, that 
are correlated with unobserved heterogeneity will be biased. Third, the model allows      and 
       to be freely correlated with each other. This relaxes the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) assumption in the conventional multinomial logit model (Greene 2002).
3
 
The inclusion of unobserved individual heterogeneity in the model, and the fact that the data do 
not provide information on individuals from the beginning of their working life, imply that the 
initial labour force/earnings status observed in the data (i.e.,     ) is unlikely to be random and 
exogenous. This causes the initial condition problem for the dynamic model as specified in 
equation (1) (Heckman 1981). A solution proposed by Heckman is to separately specify a 
reduced form model for the initial labour force/earnings status and jointly estimate the initial 
condition model with the dynamic model.  
                                                 
3
 This IIA assumption states that the odds of any two alternatives do not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of 
other alternatives. In our case, this is equivalent to assuming that the relative probabilities of being unemployed and 
taking a low pay job do not change if NILF is included as an additional choice. This obviously cannot be true.   
 6 
 
Alternatively, Wooldridge (2005) suggests modelling the distribution of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity        conditional on the initial value of the dependent variable (      and other 
exogenous explanatory variables. This study adopts the Wooldridge approach since it is easier to 
implement than the Heckman approach. In addition, to relax the assumption in a typical random 
effects model that the observed explanatory variables and unobserved individual heterogeneity 
are independent, we take the Mundlak’s (1978) approach to specify 4  
(3)               ̅       , j=1,2,3,4, 
where   ̅ is a (row) vector containing the means (over time) of the exogenous variables (    ).      
is typically a subset of the time varying variables in     .          ,      and      represent the 
random effects independent of any observed explanatory variables and are assumed to follow a 
multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and a covariance matrix   . The parameters in 
   are to be estimated along with all the coefficient parameters in the model 
                        ). 
For model identification purposes, one set of the coefficient parameters and one random effect 
associated with a particular labour force/earnings state choice have to be normalised to zero. We 
normalise the set of the parameters and the random effect associated with NILF to zero.
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Model estimation strategy 
The probability of observing individual i to take a sequence of labour force/earnings states over 
the time period from t=1 to T, conditional on the random effects                , can be written 
as 
(4)    (            )  ∏ ∏        (            ) 
    
   
 
   , 
where       , if labour force/earnings state k is taken by individual i, and        otherwise. 
The unconditional probability can then be written as, 
(5)     ∫  (         )              
                                                 
4
 In the multinomial logit model framework it is infeasible to estimate a fixed effects model. On the other hand, the 
assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is independent of all observed variables in a random effects model is 
often too strong. The unobserved heterogeneity specified in equation (3) is a compromise between fixed effects and 
random effects models.  
5
 That is                       . 
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where              is the joint distribution function of the random effects   ,    and    . The 
three-dimensional integral is evaluated using simulation methods, with              assumed to 
be normal with mean zero and a covariance matrix   ,  
(7)     ̃  
 
 
∑      
    
    
      , 
where R is the number of random draws from the distribution of             ;   
    
  and   
  are 
the r
th
 random draws from their joint distribution. We use Halton sequence to generate 50 
random draws to simulate the likelihood function. It has been shown that Halton sequence draws 
perform better than simple random draws in terms of approximating the objective function (Train 
2003). The likelihood function of a sample with N individuals is the product of equation (7) over 
the sample. A Gauss program written by the author is used to estimates the parameters by 
maximizing the log-likelihood function of the sample. 
Estimation of state-dependence and stepping stone effects 
The non-linear nature of the multinomial logit model makes interpretation of the coefficient 
estimates difficult. Unlike in a linear model, the coefficient estimates from a multinomial logit 
model cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. In particular, state-dependence and stepping 
stone effects of low pay, the focus of this study, cannot be directly inferred by reading the 
coefficient estimates on the lagged dependent variables. This subsection therefore describes how 
state-dependence and stepping stone effects can be inferred from the estimated model.  
As noted earlier, state-dependence refers to the effect of being in a state now on the probability 
of being in the same state in the future. Empirically, state-dependence can be estimated by the 
difference between the probability of remaining in a state and the probability of transitioning into 
the state from another state. Given the estimated coefficient parameters of the model  ̂, state-
dependence of low pay for an individual i with characteristics Ci=(Xi, Zi), conditional on 
unobserved heterogeneity   , can be computed as, 
(8)           (      |          ̂        )    (      |           ̂        ),  
for k=1, 2, 4. This is the difference between the probability of remaining in low pay and the 
probability of transitioning into low pay from another labour force/earnings state.  
In those earlier studies that define low pay as a binary dependent variable, state-dependence of 
low pay is estimated as the difference between the probability of remaining in low pay and the 
probability of transitioning into low pay from higher pay. In our multiple-state modelling 
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framework, state-dependence of low pay is not unique – it varies depending on the comparative 
labour force/earnings state, as shown in equation (8).  
Following the same strategy of estimating the model, the conditioning on unobserved 
heterogeneity can be integrated out through simulation by repeatedly drawing from the estimated 
distribution of    to estimate the unconditional state-dependence as     
 
 
∑       
      . 
Similarly, the stepping stone effect of low pay can be estimated by the difference between the 
probability of transitioning into higher pay from low pay and the probability of transitioning into 
higher pay from unemployment or from NILF. For an individual i with characteristics Ci=(Xi, 
Zi), conditional on unobserved heterogeneity   , the stepping stone effect can be computed as, 
(9)           (      |           ̂        )    (      |           ̂        ),  
where k=0 or 1. Unobserved heterogeneity is integrated out in a similar way as in estimating 
state-dependence, so that     
 
 
∑       
      . 
In the result section, the sample means of the estimated state-dependence and stepping stone 
effects are reported. That is,    
 
 
∑    
 
   ; and    
 
 
∑    
 
   . 
3. Data and model specification 
Data source and low pay definition 
This paper uses data from the first 11 waves of the HILDA Survey. Wooden et al. (2002)  and 
Watson and Wooden (2012) document details of this survey. In the first wave, 7,683 households 
representing 66 per cent of all in-scope households were interviewed. This generated a sample of 
15,127 persons who were 15 years or older and eligible for interviews, of whom 13,969 were 
successfully interviewed. Subsequent interviews for later waves were conducted about one year 
apart.  
The HILDA survey contains detailed information on individual characteristics, labour market 
outcomes, activity and history. Information on labour force status and earnings is used to define 
the dependent variable, labour force/earnings status (i.e., NILF, unemployment, low pay and 
higher pay). Classification of people into NILF and unemployment follows the conventional 
approach in labour economics: NILF refers to individuals who are not employed and not actively 
seeking for a job; unemployment refers to those who are not employed but actively looking for 
work.  
 9 
 
However, there is not a consensus on how to define low pay (and consequently its counterpart, 
higher pay). First, there is the issue whether weekly earnings or hourly earnings should be used 
to define low pay. Like most other household surveys, the HILDA data provide information on 
weekly earnings. However, using weekly earnings to define low pay is problematic for those 
who work part-time – they are likely to be classified as on low pay, simply because they work 
fewer hours and the low hours worked are out of their own choice (e.g., they prefer leisure to 
work or are balancing work with caring responsibilities). To avoid this problem, in this study 
hourly earnings are used to define low pay status and hourly earnings are derived by dividing 
weekly earnings by weekly hours worked from the main job.
6
 Using hourly earnings may 
overestimate low pay for those who reported very long working hours as a result of unpaid 
overtime. To partly remedy this problem, weekly working hours are top-coded at 55 hours a 
week.  
Another issue in defining low pay is where to set the low pay threshold, the hourly earnings level 
below which workers can be classified as on low pay. Different thresholds have been used in the 
literature. This study uses two low pay thresholds to test the robustness of the results: (a) two 
thirds of the median hourly earnings, which appears to be the most popular definition for low pay 
(Buddelmeyer et al. 2010); and (b) the first quintile of the hourly earnings distribution, which 
has been used in a number of studies.  
The sample used in this study includes Australian employees aged between 21 and 60 years 
(inclusive).
7
 Following convention, full-time students in the age range are excluded. 
Observations with missing dependent and independent variables are also excluded for a self-
explanatory reason.
8
 Since panel data models require at least two observations for each 
individual for identification purposes, those individuals with only one observation are excluded 
from the sample. It is well established in the literature that males and females behave differently 
in the labour market. This study therefore models males and females separately. The male 
sample has 26,951 observations, representing 4,385 individuals; the female sample has 34,017 
observations, representing 5,254 individuals.  
Summary statistics of the sample are presented in Appendix Table a1. Consistent with findings 
                                                 
6
 Specifically, weekly earnings are taken from a derived variable on weekly gross wages and salary, including 
estimation from net earnings. 
7
 That is, employers, self-employed, own account workers and contributing family workers are excluded from the 
sample since they are unlikely to be paid based on their working hours, and consequently difficult to determine their 
low pay status. 
8
 The vast majority of the observations excluded for this reason are due to missing dependent or lagged dependent 
variables.  
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in earlier studies (e.g., Healy and Richardson 2006; McGuinness et al. 2007), low paid workers 
tend to be single, young, low educated, and migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel and naturally there would be a concern over the potential 
impact of attrition on the estimation results. However, in a similar modelling framework to the 
current study, Uhlendorff (2006) shows that panel attrition can be treated as exogenous with 
respect to low pay and non-employment dynamics of German workers. In addition, Cappellari 
and Jenkins (2008) show that panel attrition is not a concern in modelling low pay transitions of 
the UK workers, where low pay is defined as a binary variable. Given these pieces of empirical 
evidence, we expect ignoring panel attrition should have little impacts on the estimation results. 
Transitions of labour force/earnings status 
Table 1 presents the year-on-year transitions of labour force/earning status by pooling all the 11 
waves of the HILDA data. For males, the transition rate from unemployment to higher pay over 
a year period is about 37 per cent, while the transition rate from low pay to higher pay is about 
51 per cent. The difference between the two transition rates is about 14 percentage points. For 
females, the gap of the transition rates is higher, at about 18 percentage points. The difference in 
the transition rate into higher pay between those who are from low pay and those who are from 
NILF is around 40 percentage points for both males and females. Therefore, for both males and 
females those who are on low pay have a higher probability of transitioning into higher pay in 
the following year than those who are either unemployed or NILF. This suggests that low pay 
employment has a stepping stone effect relative to either unemployment or NILF.  
On the other hand, low pay does show stickiness relative to other labour force/earnings states. 
That is, those who are on low pay tend to have a higher probability to be in low pay in the 
following year than those who are not on low pay. For example, for males the probability of 
remaining in low pay in the following year for those who are on low pay in this year is about 42 
per cent, compared with 4, 10 and 3 per cent respectively for those who are on higher pay, 
unemployed and NILF in this year. A similar pattern exhibits for females.  
However, we should not draw inferences on stepping stone effects and/or state-dependence of 
low pay from this simple cross-tabulation, since these results may be driven by observed and/or 
unobserved differences in individual characteristics. For example, the summary statistics show 
that those who are on low pay are less likely to have a health condition than those who are 
unemployed or NILF, and this may explain why those on low pay are more likely to move to 
higher pay than those who are not employed. In addition, it is also likely that those who are on 
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low pay have better unobserved skills (e.g., ability) than those who are not employed and 
therefore are more likely to move to higher pay in the future. The model described earlier 
controls for the differences in both observed and unobserved individual characteristics and thus 
allows for more accurate inferences regarding the stepping stone effect and state-dependence of 
low pay employment. 
Model specification 
As discussed earlier, (one year) lagged labour force/earnings states are included in the model as 
explanatory variables to estimate the stepping stone effect and state-dependence of low pay 
employment. Labour force/earnings states at the time when they first entered the survey are also 
included to address the initial condition problem. 
In addition to the lagged and initial labour force/earnings status variables, the following 
explanatory variables are included as control variables in the model: education (six dummies 
indicating the highest education qualification obtained, including degree or higher, diploma, 
certificate level 3-4, certificate level 1-2, year 12, and year 11 and below); age (five age category 
dummies); marital status (one dummy indicating whether a person is married or partnered); 
health (one dummy indicating whether long-term health condition is present); country of birth 
(three dummies indicating whether a person was born in Australia - OZ born, an immigrant from 
an English speaking country - ESC, or an immigrant from a non-English speaking country - 
NESC); age of the youngest child (five dummies indicating no dependent children under 18, 
youngest child aged 0-2, youngest child aged 3-5, youngest child aged 6-11, and youngest child 
aged 12-17); the total number of children aged under 18 years; and region of residence (four 
dummies representing cities, inner regions, outer regions and remote areas). 
Furthermore, wave dummies are included to control for the effect of time; they may also capture 
the impacts of macroeconomic conditions and policy settings on labour force/earnings status. For 
the mean variables to account for correlated random effects, the means of the time-varying 
variables marital status, health and the number of children are included in the model. 
4. Estimation result 
The main results are shown in panel (b) of Table 2. To facilitate discussion of the results, the 
mean predicted transition probabilities of the sample are presented in panel (a) of Table 2. The 
coefficient estimates of the models can be found in Appendix Table a2. 
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Stepping stone effect 
The estimates for the stepping stone effects are shown in column IV of panel (b) in Table 2. As 
discussed earlier, they are the differences between the probability of transitioning into higher pay 
from low pay and the probability of transitioning into higher pay from unemployment and NILF. 
The estimates indicate a statistically significant stepping stone effect of low pay employment. 
Also, consistent with our earlier conjecture, the stepping stone effect is larger when low pay 
employment is compared with NILF than when it is compared with unemployment.  
The estimated stepping stone effects are quantitatively similar between the two measures of low 
pay for both males and females. For males, compared with those who are out of the labour force, 
those who are on low pay have a 13 to 15 percentage point higher probability of transitioning 
into higher pay in the following year; compared with those who are unemployed, those who are 
on low pay have a 5 to 6 percentage point higher probability of transitioning into higher pay in 
the following year.  For females, the stepping stone effect of low pay as compared to NILF is 
around 14 percentage points; and the stepping stone effect as compared to unemployment is 
about 6 percentage points. Therefore, there does not appear to be a gender difference in the 
stepping stone effects of low pay employment.  
For German men, Uhlendorff (2006) estimates that those on low pay have a 5 to 6 percentage 
point higher probability of transitioning into higher pay in the following year compared with 
those who are not employed. This result is not directly comparable to that in this current study 
since Uhlendorff (2006) does not distinguish unemployment from NILF. 
State-dependence 
The estimates for state-dependence are shown in column III of panel (b) in Table 2. The results 
show that relative to other labour force/earnings states, those who are on low pay have a higher 
probability of being on low pay in the following year, an indication of state-dependence of low 
pay employment. For example, using the two-third median low pay definition, men who are on 
low pay have a 4 percentage point higher probability of being on low pay in the following year, 
compared to men who are out of the labour force or unemployed. Compared to men who are on 
higher pay, state-dependence is found to be around 5 percentage points. The estimates for state-
dependence are generally larger for females than for males for both measures of low pay.  
State-dependence of low pay as compared to higher pay estimated in this study for Australian 
males is larger than that in Uhlendorff (2006) for German men (around 3 percentage points for 
the two-third median low pay definition, and around 4 percentage points for the first quintile low 
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pay definition).  The estimates for state-depedence in this current study are close to the lower end 
of the estimates in Clarke and Kanellopoulos (2009) for males in 12 European countries (ranging 
from 0.07 for Demark to 0.24 for Portugal); they are lower than that in Stwart and Swaffield 
(1999) for British men, which ranges from 0.14 to 0.25 depending on the models and definitions 
of low pay. 
However, the state-dependence estimates for low pay employment as compared to NILF and 
unemployment need to be interpreted with caution. This is because for those who are NILF or 
unemployed, their lower probability of transitioning into low pay relative to those who are on 
low pay is not because the former have a better chance of transitioning into higher pay than the 
latter, rather it is because the former have a higher probability of remaining not employed than 
the latter. For example, the estimates in columns I and II of panel (b) in Table 2 indicate that for 
males, compared with those who are out of the labour force, those who are on low pay have a 15 
percentage point lower probability of moving out of the labour force, and a 4 percentage point 
lower probability of becoming unemployed in the following year. Compared with those who are 
unemployed, those who are on low pay have a 5 percentage point lower probability of moving 
out of the labour force, and 4 percentage point lower probability of becoming unemployed in the 
following year.  
As a result, those who are on low pay have a higher probability of remaining employed in the 
following year than those who are either unemployed or NILF.  If, from a society’s perspective, 
employment, even low paid, is a more desirable outcome than non-employment (e.g., due to 
lower welfare spending and higher tax revenue), low pay employment is preferable than non-
employment for its impact on future employment.   
Does low pay lead to joblessness? 
As discussed earlier, empirical evidence on the low pay – no pay cycle has so far been mixed in 
the literature. What can we learn from our estimates on this issue? Column II of panel (b) in 
Table 2 shows the difference between the probability of transitioning to unemployment from low 
pay and the probability of transitioning to unemployment from other labour force/earnings states. 
The results indicate that those who are on low pay have a slightly higher probability of 
transitioning to unemployment than those who are on higher pay for both males and females. 
However, these transition probability differences are very small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant, indicating that those who are on low pay are roughly equally likely to transition 
into unemployment as those who are on higher pay, a result consistent with that of Buddelmeyer 
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et al. (2010). Furthermore, the results in column I of panel (b) in Table 2 indicate that those who 
are on low pay are more or less equally likely to transition into NILF as those who are on higher 
pay. Therefore, overall the results here do not support a low pay – no pay cycle after observed 
and unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for.  
5. Conclusion 
Using the first 11 wave HILDA Survey, this study examined whether and to what extent low pay 
is persistent (i.e., state-dependence of low pay), and whether and to what extent low pay leads to 
higher pay (i.e., stepping stone effects of low pay). To this end, a dynamic random effects 
multinomial logit model was estimated separately for male and female Australians to account for 
observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity, and state-dependence and stepping stone 
effects of low pay were then computed from the estimated models. 
The results show that both state-dependence and stepping stone effects of low pay are present 
after observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity is accounted for. That is, other things 
being equal, those employees who are on low pay are more likely to be found on low pay in the 
future, compared with those who are not in the labour force, unemployed or on higher pay. On 
the other hand, other things being equal, those who are on low pay are more likely to move into 
higher pay in the future than those who are either not in the labour force or unemployed. 
While there is evidence on state-dependence of low pay employment, people who are on low pay 
are found to be more likely to be in employment in the future than those who are either 
unemployed or not in the labour force. In addition, those who are on low pay do not appear to be 
more likely to move out of employment than those who are on higher pay. These results suggest 
that there is not a low pay – no pay cycle among Australian workers, once observed and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity is accounted for.  
The findings that low pay works as a stepping stone to higher pay and does no lead to non-
employment provide supportive evidence for the work-first approach in welfare reforms and also 
suggest that minimum wages should be set at an appropriate level that promotes employment, 
even if they are low paid. 
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Table 1: Year-on-year transitions of labour force/earnings status (row percentage) 
Labour force/earnings 
status t-1 
Labour force/earnings status t 
Number of 
observations 
Not in labour 
force Unemployed Low pay Higher pay 
  
Males 
   Not in labour force 80.36 6.59 3.10 9.94 2,867 
Unemployed 20.08 32.55 10.32 37.05 1,066 
Low pay 3.63 3.99 41.64 50.74 1,955 
Higher pay 1.96 1.59 3.83 92.62 21,063 
      All males 11.14 3.52 6.75 78.59 26,951 
  
Females 
   Not-in-labour force 81.34 4.34 3.07 11.25 9,584 
Unemployed 30.86 25.79 10.66 32.69 1,144 
Low pay 10.01 3.58 35.59 50.82 2,737 
Higher pay 5.92 1.35 6.35 86.37 20,552 
      All females 28.34 3.20 7.93 60.54 34,017 
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Table 2: Predicted transition probabilities and their differences 
  Males   Females 
 
A. Two thirds median low pay threshold 
      
 
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
NILF, t Unemploy, t Low pay, t Higher pay, t 
 
NILF, t Unemploy, t Low pay, t Higher pay, t 
(1) NILF, t-1 0.2283 0.0745 0.0752 0.6220 
 
0.4186 0.0537 0.0577 0.4700 
s.e. 0.0224 0.0313 0.0172 0.0305 
 
0.0198 0.0144 0.0106 0.0199 
(2) Unemploy, t-1 0.1258 0.0716 0.0738 0.7287 
 
0.2930 0.0788 0.0791 0.5491 
s.e. 0.0159 0.0345 0.0222 0.0376 
 
0.0213 0.0235 0.0176 0.0276 
(3) Low pay, t-1 0.0779 0.0315 0.1148 0.7759 
 
0.1987 0.0283 0.1642 0.6088 
s.e. 0.0082 0.0147 0.0267 0.0297 
 
0.0154 0.0098 0.0287 0.0268 
(4) Higher pay, t-1 0.0785 0.0308 0.0624 0.8282 
 
0.2077 0.0244 0.0870 0.6810 
s.e. 0.0068 0.0132 0.0149 0.0207 
 
0.0139 0.0087 0.0171 0.0205 
 
(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
 
 
I II III IV 
 
I II III IV 
(3)-(1)  -0.1504***   -0.0430**     0.0396**     0.1539***  
 
 -0.2228***  -0.0263***   0.1070***   0.1420*** 
s.e. 0.0172 0.0219 0.0171 0.0208 
 
0.0108 0.0079 0.0205 0.018 
(3)-(2)  -0.0480***  -0.0401   0.0410**     0.0472*    
 
 -0.0962***  -0.0509***   0.0853***   0.0618*** 
s.e. 0.0106 0.0247 0.0167 0.0259 
 
0.0135 0.0151 0.0176 0.0219 
(3)-(4) -0.0006 0.0006   0.0523***   
 
-0.0088 0.004   0.0772***  
s.e. 0.005 0.0093 0.0175  
 
0.008 0.0047 0.0172  
 
B. First quintile low pay  threshold 
      
 
(a). Predicted labour force/earnings state probabilities at t, conditional on labour force/earnings state at t-1 
 
NILF, t Unemploy, t Low pay, t Higher pay, t 
 
NILF, t Unemploy, t Low pay, t Higher pay, t 
(1) NILF, t-1 0.2349 0.0800 0.1201 0.5650 
 
0.4212 0.0535 0.1071 0.4182 
s.e. 0.0229 0.0311 0.0216 0.0296 
 
0.0199 0.0135 0.0161 0.0174 
(2) Unemploy, t-1 0.1342 0.0751 0.1526 0.6380 
 
0.2938 0.0665 0.1451 0.4946 
s.e. 0.0172 0.0340 0.0325 0.0422 
 
0.0210 0.0196 0.0252 0.0253 
(3) Low pay, t-1 0.0802 0.0342 0.1876 0.6980 
 
0.1982 0.0293 0.2402 0.5322 
s.e. 0.0084 0.0143 0.0316 0.0330 
 
0.0160 0.0095 0.0317 0.0258 
(4) Higher pay, t-1 0.0771 0.0301 0.1080 0.7847 
 
0.2081 0.0257 0.1479 0.6182 
s.e. 0.0066 0.0125 0.0205 0.0239 
 
0.0138 0.0084 0.0223 0.0207 
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(b). Differences in predicted transition probabilities (relative to transition probabilities from low pay) 
 
 
I II III IV 
 
I II III IV 
(3)-(1)  -0.1547***    -0.0458**      0.0675***     0.1329***   
 
 -0.2199***  -0.0254***   0.1065***   0.1388*** 
s.e. 0.0174 0.022 0.0195 0.0223 
 
0.0114 0.0081 0.0207 0.0172 
(3)-(2)  -0.0540***    -0.0410*       0.0350*       0.0600**    
 
 -0.0943***  -0.0505***   0.0851***   0.0597*** 
s.e. 0.0115 0.0245 0.0208 0.0264 
 
0.0136 0.0163 0.0178 0.0205 
(3)-(4) 0.0031 0.004   0.0796***    
 
-0.0089 0.0038   0.0772***  
s.e. 0.0047 0.0085 0.0183    0.0074 0.0047 0.0168  
*** indicates significant at 1%; ** 5% and * 10%.  
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Appendix Summary statistics and coefficient estimates 
Table a1: Summary statistics of modelling samples 
          Males   Females 
  NILF Unemp Low pay
(a) 
Higher pay All   NILF Unemp Low pay
(a) 
Higher pay All 
Year 11 or below 41.45
(b) 
38.46 33.68 17.62 22.09 
 
45.84 34.22 36.65 20.59 29.45 
Year 12 11.33 11.49 19.29 12.95 13.14 
 
16.06 17.39 16.21 14.38 15.1 
Certificate 1 or 2 3.3 4.11 4.51 1.27 1.82 
 
3.48 6.26 4.3 1.83 2.63 
Certificate 3 or 4 25.26 25.92 25.66 30.27 29.25 
 
13.05 20.24 21.48 15.33 15.33 
Diploma 7.53 7.9 6.87 9.46 9.02 
 
7.65 7.27 9.72 11.14 9.92 
Degree or higher 11.13 12.12 10 28.43 24.68 
 
13.93 14.63 11.65 36.73 27.57 
Married/de facto 55.41 48.79 56.54 75.09 70.72 
 
73.23 52.9 67.21 71.38 70.98 
Health condition 72.14 31.61 23.68 14.53 22.16 
 
38.05 32.84 20.85 14.91 22.51 
Age 21-24 3.73 13.91 17.53 5.58 6.47 
 
4.65 12.6 9.27 5.49 5.78 
Age 25-34 11.86 27.61 30.38 27.14 25.68 
 
23.46 29.25 23.52 24.6 24.34 
Age 35-44 18.43 25.92 22.86 30.94 28.83 
 
27.4 29.62 28.49 29.93 29.09 
Age 45-54 30.76 21.81 21.1 26.96 26.8 
 
23.06 21.16 27.82 30.19 27.69 
Age 55+ 35.22 10.75 8.13 9.38 12.22 
 
21.43 7.36 10.91 9.79 13.1 
Australian born 77.77 77.56 82.2 80.39 80.12 
 
75.74 77.55 81.9 79.89 78.8 
Immigrants-ESC 9.13 10.85 6.87 9.91 9.65 
 
7.94 7.36 7.05 9.41 8.74 
Immigrants-NESC 13.1 11.59 10.93 9.7 10.23 
 
16.33 15.09 11.05 10.7 12.46 
No children under 18 74.88 72.5 70.6 56.29 59.9 
 
41.09 48.21 52.23 55.22 50.75 
Youngest 0-2 6.63 11.91 11.48 13.4 12.47 
 
25.33 11.5 7.75 8.07 13.05 
Youngest 3-5 4.77 4.43 4.89 7.81 7.16 
 
12.11 9.66 8.57 7.31 8.84 
Youngest 6-11 7.53 5.8 6.98 12.34 11.21 
 
12.33 18.31 17.21 14.84 14.43 
Youngest 12-17 6.2 5.37 6.04 10.16 9.27 
 
9.14 12.33 14.24 14.56 12.93 
Number of children 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.81 0.75 
 
1.26 0.98 0.89 0.81 0.95 
s.t. 1.06 1.05 1.00 1.07 1.07 
 
1.37 1.14 1.13 1.04 1.17 
City 52.65 57.96 52.69 66.06 63.38 
 
58.62 60.72 53.49 66.24 62.9 
Inner region 29.39 24.97 29.84 22.95 24.21 
 
26.21 25.67 28.19 22.72 24.23 
Outer region 17.06 14.12 15.33 9.14 10.62 
 
13 11.59 15.91 9.13 10.84 
Remote area 0.9 2.95 2.14 1.84 1.79 
 
2.17 2.02 2.41 1.91 2.03 
            No of observations 3,001 949 1,820 21,181 26,951   9,640 1,087 2,696 20,594 34,017 
Note: (a) The two-third median low pay definition is used for the summary statistics. (b) Except for the variable on the number of children, statistics for all other variables are in 
percentage. 
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Table a2: Coefficient estimates of the models 
  Two-third median   First quintile 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
  Coef. S.e.   Coef. S.e.   Coef. S.e.   Coef. S.e. 
 
Unemployment 
         Unem t-1 1.031 0.172 
 
1.112 0.123 
 
0.937 0.178 
 
0.935 0.133 
Low pay t-1 1.047 0.248 
 
0.739 0.160 
 
1.025 0.208 
 
0.730 0.139 
Higher pay t-1 0.994 0.159 
 
0.494 0.116 
 
0.947 0.167 
 
0.486 0.125 
Degree -0.179 0.204 
 
0.217 0.134 
 
-0.159 0.210 
 
0.221 0.146 
diploma 0.173 0.216 
 
0.147 0.158 
 
0.259 0.222 
 
0.145 0.172 
Certificate 3-4 0.020 0.150 
 
0.544 0.118 
 
0.029 0.155 
 
0.554 0.128 
Certificate 1-2 0.385 0.248 
 
0.507 0.208 
 
0.380 0.263 
 
0.525 0.233 
Year 12 -0.191 0.208 
 
0.134 0.120 
 
-0.207 0.214 
 
0.151 0.130 
Age21-24 0.678 0.252 
 
0.588 0.174 
 
0.717 0.256 
 
0.633 0.182 
Age25-34 0.134 0.158 
 
0.194 0.104 
 
0.118 0.162 
 
0.218 0.109 
Age45-54 -0.404 0.159 
 
-0.493 0.112 
 
-0.402 0.162 
 
-0.521 0.118 
Age55+ -1.306 0.191 
 
-1.441 0.159 
 
-1.344 0.192 
 
-1.462 0.167 
Married/de facto 0.033 0.234 
 
-0.623 0.159 
 
0.040 0.235 
 
-0.641 0.160 
Health condition -0.825 0.168 
 
-0.027 0.129 
 
-0.828 0.169 
 
-0.005 0.129 
Immigrants-ESC 0.159 0.205 
 
-0.121 0.169 
 
0.120 0.207 
 
-0.096 0.181 
Immigrants-NESC -0.070 0.204 
 
0.057 0.121 
 
-0.048 0.211 
 
0.068 0.130 
Youngest 0-2 0.130 0.264 
 
-1.300 0.151 
 
0.131 0.263 
 
-1.298 0.155 
Youngest 3-5 0.000 0.255 
 
-0.293 0.144 
 
-0.022 0.260 
 
-0.300 0.148 
Youngest 6-11 0.344 0.292 
 
0.321 0.146 
 
0.333 0.295 
 
0.308 0.150 
Youngest 12-17 0.620 0.269 
 
0.516 0.144 
 
0.720 0.279 
 
0.505 0.150 
No. of children -0.239 0.188 
 
-0.218 0.114 
 
-0.267 0.191 
 
-0.205 0.116 
Inner region -0.004 0.141 
 
-0.102 0.097 
 
-0.013 0.145 
 
-0.102 0.105 
Outer region -0.256 0.165 
 
-0.076 0.128 
 
-0.304 0.172 
 
-0.076 0.138 
Remote area 0.608 0.344 
 
-0.256 0.265 
 
0.551 0.349 
 
-0.238 0.281 
Wave 3 -0.305 0.240 
 
-0.535 0.177 
 
-0.316 0.240 
 
-0.501 0.180 
Wave 4 -0.603 0.263 
 
-0.265 0.186 
 
-0.628 0.265 
 
-0.280 0.187 
Wave 5 -0.278 0.264 
 
-0.145 0.188 
 
-0.301 0.265 
 
-0.161 0.188 
Wave 6 -0.354 0.258 
 
-0.059 0.190 
 
-0.375 0.260 
 
-0.093 0.193 
Wave 7 -0.628 0.282 
 
-0.099 0.189 
 
-0.643 0.280 
 
-0.129 0.190 
Wave 8 -0.451 0.267 
 
-0.017 0.190 
 
-0.477 0.267 
 
-0.051 0.194 
Wave 9 -0.170 0.268 
 
-0.129 0.188 
 
-0.192 0.270 
 
-0.171 0.190 
Wave 10 -0.206 0.261 
 
0.021 0.188 
 
-0.216 0.262 
 
-0.009 0.192 
Wave 11 -0.193 0.255 
 
-0.175 0.190 
 
-0.207 0.257 
 
-0.203 0.193 
Unem t0 3.167 0.219 
 
2.850 0.145 
 
3.334 0.234 
 
3.031 0.165 
Low pay t0 1.874 0.291 
 
1.758 0.183 
 
1.988 0.265 
 
1.675 0.165 
Higher pay t0 1.848 0.210 
 
1.556 0.139 
 
1.914 0.224 
 
1.426 0.146 
Mean (married) -0.014 0.278 
 
-0.097 0.191 
 
-0.043 0.283 
 
-0.115 0.197 
Mean (health) -0.551 0.250 
 
-0.770 0.186 
 
-0.488 0.255 
 
-0.755 0.193 
Mean (children) -0.047 0.142 
 
-0.002 0.093 
 
-0.027 0.143 
 
-0.007 0.096 
Constant -1.691 0.309 
 
-1.987 0.220 
 
-1.770 0.318 
 
-2.117 0.231 
 
Low pay 
          Unem t-1 1.205 0.228 
 
1.134 0.153 
 
1.457 0.194 
 
1.166 0.136 
Low pay t-1 2.899 0.226 
 
2.784 0.120 
 
2.902 0.186 
 
2.617 0.093 
Higher pay t-1 2.112 0.186 
 
2.013 0.096 
 
2.288 0.166 
 
1.985 0.081 
Degree -0.554 0.210 
 
-0.412 0.122 
 
-0.602 0.194 
 
-0.378 0.110 
diploma -0.159 0.223 
 
0.038 0.132 
 
-0.141 0.198 
 
0.076 0.121 
Certificate 3-4 -0.037 0.161 
 
0.336 0.105 
 
0.056 0.148 
 
0.417 0.097 
Certificate 1-2 0.025 0.340 
 
0.349 0.192 
 
-0.062 0.320 
 
0.298 0.185 
Year 12 0.190 0.211 
 
-0.123 0.121 
 
0.057 0.193 
 
-0.007 0.109 
Age21-24 0.841 0.272 
 
0.433 0.169 
 
0.783 0.253 
 
0.441 0.159 
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Age25-34 0.168 0.161 
 
0.001 0.099 
 
0.109 0.148 
 
-0.001 0.089 
Age45-54 -0.379 0.157 
 
-0.238 0.098 
 
-0.475 0.141 
 
-0.223 0.089 
Age55+ -1.593 0.194 
 
-1.150 0.131 
 
-1.799 0.172 
 
-1.161 0.119 
Married/de facto 0.174 0.217 
 
-0.450 0.134 
 
0.099 0.201 
 
-0.389 0.121 
Health condition -0.924 0.164 
 
-0.478 0.103 
 
-0.974 0.151 
 
-0.447 0.090 
Immigrants-ESC -0.160 0.248 
 
-0.228 0.143 
 
-0.274 0.219 
 
-0.200 0.131 
Immigrants-NESC -0.005 0.195 
 
-0.240 0.119 
 
-0.091 0.193 
 
-0.277 0.108 
Youngest 0-2 -0.095 0.281 
 
-1.684 0.132 
 
-0.255 0.257 
 
-1.766 0.118 
Youngest 3-5 -0.047 0.267 
 
-0.122 0.113 
 
-0.159 0.246 
 
-0.075 0.099 
Youngest 6-11 0.465 0.312 
 
0.444 0.117 
 
0.377 0.283 
 
0.444 0.108 
Youngest 12-17 0.805 0.283 
 
0.531 0.118 
 
0.906 0.263 
 
0.611 0.109 
No. of children -0.473 0.185 
 
-0.390 0.087 
 
-0.392 0.164 
 
-0.497 0.078 
Inner region 0.247 0.139 
 
0.030 0.085 
 
0.124 0.128 
 
0.024 0.076 
Outer region 0.026 0.165 
 
0.231 0.107 
 
-0.169 0.149 
 
0.118 0.100 
Remote area 0.858 0.394 
 
0.113 0.212 
 
0.676 0.396 
 
0.009 0.188 
Wave 3 -0.042 0.244 
 
-0.373 0.149 
 
-0.113 0.222 
 
-0.137 0.131 
Wave 4 -0.143 0.259 
 
-0.094 0.155 
 
-0.189 0.238 
 
-0.020 0.139 
Wave 5 -0.098 0.269 
 
0.145 0.156 
 
-0.085 0.247 
 
0.307 0.140 
Wave 6 0.275 0.258 
 
0.328 0.154 
 
0.068 0.240 
 
0.244 0.141 
Wave 7 -0.014 0.265 
 
0.276 0.155 
 
-0.144 0.245 
 
0.243 0.141 
Wave 8 0.136 0.267 
 
0.475 0.158 
 
-0.011 0.244 
 
0.384 0.146 
Wave 9 0.066 0.262 
 
0.125 0.157 
 
-0.164 0.242 
 
-0.008 0.144 
Wave 10 -0.320 0.265 
 
0.223 0.158 
 
-0.332 0.243 
 
0.163 0.144 
Wave 11 -0.238 0.268 
 
-0.077 0.158 
 
-0.302 0.246 
 
-0.062 0.144 
Unem t0 1.807 0.283 
 
1.467 0.177 
 
1.695 0.262 
 
1.399 0.167 
Low pay t0 4.641 0.285 
 
3.414 0.158 
 
4.248 0.251 
 
3.293 0.129 
Higher pay t0 2.674 0.241 
 
2.205 0.126 
 
2.513 0.233 
 
2.288 0.114 
Mean (married) 0.095 0.270 
 
0.159 0.169 
 
0.259 0.250 
 
0.117 0.154 
Mean (health) -0.668 0.251 
 
-0.820 0.169 
 
-0.821 0.230 
 
-0.965 0.152 
Mean (children) 0.123 0.138 
 
0.210 0.076 
 
0.044 0.123 
 
0.274 0.066 
Constant -3.196 0.371 
 
-2.885 0.213 
 
-2.438 0.336 
 
-2.400 0.196 
 
Higher pay 
          Unem t-1 1.571 0.166 
 
1.079 0.124 
 
1.366 0.177 
 
1.127 0.130 
Low pay t-1 2.876 0.207 
 
2.160 0.102 
 
2.751 0.175 
 
2.167 0.086 
Higher pay t-1 3.064 0.118 
 
2.334 0.059 
 
3.162 0.126 
 
2.395 0.064 
Degree 0.643 0.173 
 
0.957 0.101 
 
0.711 0.170 
 
1.054 0.103 
diploma 0.400 0.197 
 
0.631 0.119 
 
0.471 0.190 
 
0.666 0.118 
Certificate 3-4 0.445 0.138 
 
0.698 0.095 
 
0.498 0.135 
 
0.725 0.096 
Certificate 1-2 -0.018 0.292 
 
0.185 0.190 
 
-0.007 0.280 
 
0.077 0.194 
Year 12 0.395 0.185 
 
0.378 0.106 
 
0.405 0.182 
 
0.458 0.108 
Age21-24 0.091 0.255 
 
-0.016 0.159 
 
0.048 0.250 
 
-0.109 0.161 
Age25-34 -0.046 0.144 
 
-0.086 0.080 
 
-0.060 0.141 
 
-0.057 0.081 
Age45-54 -0.474 0.136 
 
-0.240 0.083 
 
-0.439 0.133 
 
-0.232 0.084 
Age55+ -1.871 0.155 
 
-1.393 0.108 
 
-1.796 0.152 
 
-1.386 0.107 
Married/de facto 0.151 0.189 
 
-0.406 0.109 
 
0.161 0.190 
 
-0.434 0.110 
Health condition -1.040 0.138 
 
-0.464 0.080 
 
-1.016 0.140 
 
-0.477 0.082 
Immigrants-ESC -0.153 0.199 
 
-0.162 0.125 
 
-0.145 0.187 
 
-0.053 0.123 
Immigrants-NESC -0.417 0.172 
 
-0.558 0.110 
 
-0.363 0.179 
 
-0.533 0.108 
Youngest 0-2 -0.226 0.237 
 
-1.795 0.099 
 
-0.147 0.235 
 
-1.770 0.099 
Youngest 3-5 -0.059 0.217 
 
-0.072 0.085 
 
-0.096 0.221 
 
-0.079 0.088 
Youngest 6-11 0.417 0.268 
 
0.523 0.098 
 
0.448 0.260 
 
0.558 0.101 
Youngest 12-17 0.794 0.238 
 
0.771 0.103 
 
0.930 0.239 
 
0.805 0.106 
No. of children -0.323 0.146 
 
-0.596 0.067 
 
-0.362 0.146 
 
-0.583 0.068 
Inner region -0.148 0.120 
 
-0.278 0.075 
 
-0.161 0.118 
 
-0.302 0.074 
Outer region -0.482 0.145 
 
-0.276 0.101 
 
-0.521 0.144 
 
-0.287 0.103 
Remote area 0.691 0.357 
 
-0.213 0.183 
 
0.904 0.354 
 
-0.196 0.184 
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Wave 3 0.009 0.207 
 
-0.030 0.117 
 
0.033 0.207 
 
-0.081 0.120 
Wave 4 -0.110 0.225 
 
0.032 0.125 
 
-0.102 0.226 
 
0.021 0.128 
Wave 5 -0.009 0.232 
 
0.255 0.128 
 
-0.014 0.232 
 
0.191 0.130 
Wave 6 0.062 0.229 
 
0.271 0.128 
 
0.109 0.230 
 
0.308 0.129 
Wave 7 -0.028 0.233 
 
0.243 0.129 
 
0.003 0.234 
 
0.266 0.131 
Wave 8 0.134 0.230 
 
0.346 0.133 
 
0.183 0.229 
 
0.372 0.136 
Wave 9 -0.012 0.233 
 
0.045 0.131 
 
0.062 0.234 
 
0.096 0.133 
Wave 10 -0.185 0.230 
 
0.090 0.131 
 
-0.150 0.230 
 
0.093 0.134 
Wave 11 -0.120 0.232 
 
-0.032 0.131 
 
-0.059 0.232 
 
-0.031 0.133 
Unem t0 1.716 0.237 
 
1.523 0.167 
 
1.765 0.239 
 
1.461 0.171 
Low pay t0 3.064 0.256 
 
2.679 0.147 
 
3.249 0.235 
 
2.711 0.128 
Higher pay t0 4.307 0.204 
 
3.742 0.111 
 
4.307 0.209 
 
3.896 0.112 
Mean (married) 0.662 0.232 
 
0.243 0.145 
 
0.634 0.235 
 
0.268 0.146 
Mean (health) -1.337 0.212 
 
-1.411 0.147 
 
-1.238 0.215 
 
-1.440 0.150 
Mean (children) 0.046 0.112 
 
0.275 0.058 
 
0.054 0.112 
 
0.245 0.059 
Constant -2.026 0.314 
 
-1.844 0.192 
 
-2.326 0.312 
 
-2.126 0.195 
            c11
(a) 
-0.910 0.115 
 
-0.815 0.090 
 
-1.004 0.113 
 
-0.973 0.094 
c21 -1.393 0.131 
 
-1.281 0.074 
 
-1.121 0.137 
 
-0.986 0.099 
c22 0.841 0.143 
 
0.043 0.095 
 
-1.037 0.101 
 
-0.880 0.091 
c31 -0.832 0.133 
 
-1.196 0.085 
 
-0.783 0.134 
 
-0.870 0.098 
c32 0.576 0.138 
 
-0.883 0.091 
 
-0.571 0.108 
 
-0.830 0.090 
c33 1.123 0.067 
 
-0.233 0.102 
 
1.082 0.055 
 
0.933 0.040 
            Log-likelihood -10039.24 
 
-18282.19 
 
-11997.80 
 
-20629.25 
Observations 26951   34017   26951   34017 
Note: c11-c33 refer to the corresponding elements in the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix 
of the random effects. 
